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ABSTRACT
The aim of judgment aggregation is to make collective decisions
based on the judgments of individual agents. Some rationality con-
ditions governing the expected behavior of the aggregation function
must be considered. However, impossibility theorems show that
designing an aggregation function satisfying all desirable proper-
ties is not feasible. While some rationality conditions are very nat-
ural ones, other ones are more disputable. We show that this is
the case of the systematicity condition that prevents from electing
issues with more votes than others. We rather promote a neutral-
ity and a swap optimality condition. Swap optimality ensures that
among two possible results, the one with the best support (number
of votes) is chosen. We propose a new family of judgment aggrega-
tion methods based on the support (number of votes) that receives
each issue.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
[Computing methodologies]: Artificial intelligence : Knowledge
representation and reasoning
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
Social choice theory, Judgment Aggregation
1. INTRODUCTION
Judgment aggregation aims at making collective decisions on a
set of issues from the opinions (judgments) expressed by individu-
als on these issues. These issues are usually not logically indepen-
dent. The output of such an aggregation process is one or several
social judgment sets, reflecting the opinion of the group of agents
on the issues. Judgment aggregation is a very active research topic
in Social Choice Theory, Political Philosophy and Artificial Intelli-
gence [18, 15, 12, 2, 8, 16, 11, 9, 3]. Much work about judgment
aggregation has been devoted to the study of rationality properties
for aggregation methods, and the main results are impossibility the-
orems, showing that no judgment aggregation method satisfies all
expected properties [15, 13, 16, 9].
Appears in: Alessio Lomuscio, Paul Scerri, Ana Bazzan, and
Michael Huhns (eds.), Proceedings of the 13th International Con-
ference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS
2014), May 5-9, 2014, Paris, France.
Copyright c© 2014, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 maj
ϕ1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
ϕ2 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
ϕ3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Table 1: A doctrinal paradox
Let us illustrate the difficulty raised up when aggregating judg-
ments by considering a simple example. Consider the three propo-
sitional formulae ϕ1 = a, ϕ2 = b, ϕ3 = ¬a ∨ ¬b: it is not
possible to accept ϕ1, ϕ2 and ϕ3 together since they are jointly in-
consistent. Table 1 reports the opinions of each individual from a
group of seven people {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} on these three formulae
(1 means "accept" and 0 "reject"). For example, agent 1’s judg-
ment is that a is true, that b is also true, and that ¬a ∨ ¬b is not
true. Each individual opinion is only constrained by a rationality
condition of consistency: for any agent, the set of judgments she
reports is supposed to be consistent. A natural method to make a
collective decision is to use a majority vote: if a majority of agents
accepts an issue, then this issue is accepted by the group. Using
this method, since a majority of individuals are for ϕ1, for ϕ2 and
for ϕ3, the decision made by the majority should be ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 ∧ϕ3,
which is not consistent. Examples of this kind are called doctrinal
paradoxes (see [16] for more details).
While this example illustrates that simple majority vote does not
work as an admissible judgment aggregation (JA) method, a key
issue is to determine alternative methods to do the job. Echoing
impossibility theorems in voting theory, impossibility theorems for
judgment aggregation state that there is no method satisfying the
full set of expected rationality properties [15, 13, 16, 9]. As a con-
sequence, some rationality conditions must be given up.
Many impossibility theorems consider a property referred to as
systematicity, which basically states that the collective judgment
on each issue is the same function of individual judgments on that
issue, whatever the votes on the other issues. This property may
be seen as a way to ensure some form of strategy-proofness: the
collective decision cannot be changed by adding or removing some
issues of the agenda (this property is related to the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives in voting theory [1]). However, system-
aticity prevents from considering judgment aggregation as an opti-
mization process: an issue is accepted or rejected independently of
the votes on the other issues.Thus, adhering to systematicity may
prevent from selecting issues getting more votes than others, be-
cause comparison between issues is not allowed. In our opinion,
this behaviour is not desirable.
Contrastingly, many existing judgments aggregation methods do
not satisfy the neutrality condition, that we consider as a first class
requirement. Neutrality intuitively states that all the issues have
to be considered on an equal basis, without any priority between
them. The premise-based method [18, 2, 6], the conclusion-based
method [18, 2, 20], the sequential priority rule [12] violate neutral-
ity, by requiring additional information to make a decision (such as
a set of identified premises). Of course, when some additional in-
formation is available, such as a distinction between premises and
conclusions, or some priority between the formulae, then this ex-
tra information has to be taken into account and neutrality must
be given up. However, in the remaining case, neutrality is a way
to avoid some arbitrariness to take place in the aggregation pro-
cess. Distance-based methods [19] and more generally the methods
based on minimization recently proposed in [11] satisfy it.
In this paper, we first criticize systematicity in presence of neu-
trality. Chapman [3] also criticizes systematicity, because this prop-
erty prevents from considering the logical interactions between is-
sues to solve the conflicts. Our work is different from Chapman’s
because we consider the case where no additional information is
available, so neutrality has to be satisfied. We provide both a natu-
ral example highlighting the limits of systematicity, and an impos-
sibility theorem showing that it conflicts with other expected ratio-
nality properties. Then we define and study judgment aggregation
methods which select consistent sets of issues as social judgment
sets, based on the support (number of votes) of their elements. As
a matter of illustration, on the previous example, one can easily ob-
serve that each of ϕ1 and ϕ2 receives 5 (out of 7) votes, whereas
ϕ3 receives only 4 votes. While the three issues are accepted by
a majority of individuals, the supports of ϕ1 and of ϕ2 are strictly
greater than the one of ϕ3. This can be considered as a sufficient
evidence for preferring the judgment set {ϕ1, ϕ2} (and so ¬ϕ3), to
the judgment sets {ϕ2, ϕ3} and {ϕ1, ϕ3}.
Quite surprisingly, only few JA methods take such support infor-
mation into account; the most notable exception is Porello-Endriss’
method [21], equivalent to Lang et al.’s ranked agenda method [11],
which is the instantiation to JA of Tideman’s ranked pairs method
[23, 26]. This is rather astonishing since, if one interprets these
aggregations from an epistemic point of view1, then the more votes
an issue gets, then the more likely it is (see Section 5 for a more
formal discussion).
We introduce the family of Support-based Aggregation Corre-
spondences (SAC). This family gathers methods for which the se-
lection of an issue in a social judgment set depends only on its
logical interactions with the other issues and on the level of support
it gets from the individuals. We specifically focus on the subset of
SAC consisting of ranked majority methods. Such methods select
consistent judgment sets based on the number of votes received by
their elements. We study the rationality properties offered by these
methods both in the general case and for some specific methods.
We also discuss the significance of some of the ranked majority
methods using truth tracking arguments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first gives
some formal preliminaries. Then some rationality properties for
aggregation methods are recalled and discussed in Section 3. SAC
and ranked majority methods are defined in Section 4. In Section
5 several ranked majority methods are characterized thanks to truth
tracking arguments. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. For
space reasons, only the proofs of the main results are reported.
2. FORMAL PRELIMINARIES
An agenda is a finite, non-empty and totally ordered set of non-
trivial (i.e., non-contradictory and non-tautological) propositional
formulae X = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm}.
A judgment on a formulaϕk ofX is an element ofD = {1, 0, ?},
1Under usual reliability and independence assumptions [4, 14, 7].
where 1 means that ϕk is supported, 0 that ¬ϕk is supported, ? that
neither ϕk nor ¬ϕk are supported. A judgment set on X is a map-
ping γ fromX toD, also viewed as the set of formulae {ϕk | ϕk ∈
X and γ(ϕk) = 1} ∪ {¬ϕk | ϕk ∈ X and γ(ϕk) = 0}. For each
ϕk of X , γ is supposed to satisfy γ(¬ϕk) = ¬γ(ϕk), where ¬γ is
given by ¬γ(ϕk) = ? iff γ(ϕk) = ?, ¬γ(ϕk) = 1 iff γ(ϕk) = 0,
and ¬γ(ϕk) = 0 iff γ(ϕk) = 1.
Judgment sets are often asked to be consistent and resolute: A
judgment set γ on X is consistent iff
∧
{ϕk∈X|γ(ϕk)=1} ϕk ∧∧
{ϕk∈X|γ(ϕk)=0} ¬ϕk is consistent. It is resolute iff ∀ϕk ∈ X,
γ(ϕk) = 0 or γ(ϕk) = 1.
Aggregating judgments consists in associating a collective judg-
ment set with a profile of individual judgment sets: A profile P =
(γ1, . . . , γn) on X is a vector of judgments sets on X . It is con-
sistent (resp. resolute) when each judgment set in it is consistent
(resp. resolute).
For each agendaX , a judgment aggregation method δ associates
with a profile P onX a non-empty set δ(P ) of judgment sets γP on
X . When δ(P ) is a singleton for each P , the judgment aggregation
method is called a (deterministic) judgment aggregation rule, and
it is called a judgment aggregation correspondence otherwise [11].
3. RATIONALITY ISSUES
What are the properties judgment aggregation methods should
satisfy? Many intuitions are captured by the following properties2.
The first one states that no specific condition must be imposed on
the input profile, but consistency:
Universal domain. The domain of δ is the set of all consistent
profiles.
This property is often relaxed [15] to:
R-universal domain. The domain of δ is the set of all profiles
which are consistent and resolute.
Some properties also state that the result should be consistent
and resolute:
Collective rationality. For any profile P in the domain of δ, δ(P )
is a set of consistent collective judgment sets.
Collective completeness.3 For any profile P in the domain of δ,
δ(P ) is a set of resolute collective judgment sets.
It is usually expected that agents play symmetric roles:
Anonymity. For any two profiles P = (γ1, . . . , γn) and P ′ =
(γ′1, . . . , γ
′
n) in the domain of δ which are permutations one an-
other, we have δ(P ) = δ(P ′).
Systematicity states that issues receiving the same support must
be treated in the same way:
Systematicity. For any two profiles P = (γ1, . . . , γn) and P ′ =
(γ′1, . . . , γ
′
n) in the domain of δ, and any two propositions ϕk and
ϕl of X , such that γi(ϕk) = γ′i(ϕl)∀i, if γP (ϕk) = x for all
γP ∈ δ(P ), then γ′P ′(ϕl) = x for all γ′P ′ ∈ δ(P ′).
Unanimity states that if all agents agree on the judgment on an
issue, then the collective judgment on this issue must be the unani-
mous one:
Unanimity. For any ϕk ∈ X , if γi(ϕk) = x with x ∈ {0, 1},
∀γi ∈ P , then for every γP ∈ δ(P ), we have γP (ϕk) = x.
2Most of these properties are usually stated for judgment aggrega-
tion rules and for resolute profiles. We translate these properties in
the more general setting of judgment aggregation correspondences
and without the resolutneness assumption. See [22] for a similar
translation.
3Sometimes also called (collective resoluteness).
Note that Unanimity is not stated when all agents vote ? for a
formula. In this case it does not seem desirable to force ? for the
collective decision, since the value of this formula may be imposed
by the decisions on other logically related formulas.
In order to define the next property which expresses a form of
compliance to majority, we need a few preliminary definitions: let
g+P , g
−
P and gP be the majority counting functions from X to Z
given by g+P (ϕk) = |{γi ∈ P | γi(ϕk) = 1}| and g−P (ϕk) =
|{γi ∈ P | γi(ϕk) = 0}|, and gP (ϕk) = g+P (ϕk) − g−P (ϕk).
These functions can be straightforwardly extended to mappings
from X ∪ {¬ϕk | ϕk ∈ X} to Z so that for any ϕk ∈ X , we
have g+P (¬ϕk) = g−P (ϕk), g−P (¬ϕk) = g+P (ϕk), and gP (¬ϕk) =
−gP (ϕk),
We can now define formally the majoritarian aggregation rule
δmaj , which is the judgment aggregation rule we considered in the
example given in the introduction.
DEFINITION 1. The majoritarian aggregation rule δmaj is de-
fined as follows. For any agenda X and any profile P on X , we
have δmaj (P ) = {γmajP }, where for any issue ϕk ∈ X:
γmajP (ϕk) =
 1 if gP (ϕk) > 00 if gP (ϕk) < 0? if gP (ϕk) = 0
We are now in position to define the majority preservation prop-
erty:
Majority preservation. If γmajP is consistent and resolute, then
δ(P ) = {δmaj(P )}.
Majority preservation4 [22] is a very natural property, stating that
if the simple majority vote on each issue leads to a consistent judg-
ment set, then the judgment aggregation correspondence must con-
tain this set, and no other set. The idea is to stick to the result
furnished by a simple majority vote when no doctrinal paradox oc-
curs.
Some additional logical properties seem also reasonable for judg-
ment aggregation correspondences. Thus, when all the information
available is given by the input profile, it is expected that issues play
symmetric roles:
Neutrality. If X = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} and X ′ = {ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ′m} are
two agendas such that there exists a permutation σ over {1, . . . ,m}
satisfying ϕk = ϕ′σ(k) for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then for any
profiles P = (γ1, . . . , γn) on X and P ′ = (γ′1, . . . , γ′n) on X ′
such that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
γi(ϕk) = γ
′
i(ϕ
′
σ(k)), we have δ(P ) = δ(P
′).
We want to stress that this neutrality property is different from
the one usually considered in judgment aggregation, where sys-
tematicity is equivalent to the two properties of independence and
"neutrality" [15]. Both properties differ even in the restricted case
of resolute profiles. The usual "neutrality" property is a weakening
of systematicity, and is far from the standard meaning of neutrality
in vote theory, which is the one we want to capture by our property.
Finally, let us define the swap γP |S of a collective judgment set
γP with respect to a set of issues S ⊆ X as γP |S(ϕk) = γP (ϕk) if
ϕk 6∈ S, and γP |S(ϕk) = ¬γP (ϕk) if ϕk ∈ S. We may consider
the following property:
Swap optimality. If γP ∈ δ(P ), then there are no ϕk, ϕl ∈ X
such that γP |{ϕk,ϕl} is consistent and max(g
+
P (¬ϕk), g+P (¬ϕl)) >
max(g+P (ϕk), g
+
P (ϕl)).
Swap optimality requires that the selection of collective judg-
ment sets depends on the number of votes received by each issue.
4Called strong majority preservation in [22].
P ϕ1 ϕ2 ϕ3 ϕ4 ϕ5 ϕ6
1 1 1 0 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 0 1 1
3 1 1 1 1 0 1
4 1 1 1 1 1 0
5 1 0 1 1 1 1
6 1 0 1 1 1 1
P ′ ϕ1 ϕ2 ϕ3 ϕ4 ϕ5 ϕ6
1′ 0 1 1 1 1 1
2′ 0 1 1 1 1 1
3′ 0 1 1 1 1 1
4′ 0 1 1 1 1 1
5′ 1 0 0 0 0 0
6′ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Profiles P and P’
So if one can consistently replace in a collective judgment set any
pair of formulae of the agenda by their negations, one should not
get a better number of votes for any of these two negated formu-
lae. This property ensures that most supported formulae are chosen
from a profile, when it is possible to do so. R-swap optimality is
the relaxation of swap optimality where only resolute profiles P
are considered. In this case, the expression of the swap optimality
condition is simpler:
R-swap optimality. If P is resolute and γP ∈ δ(P ), then there are
no ϕk, ϕl ∈ X such that γP |{ϕk,ϕl} is consistent and g
+
P (ϕk) +
g+P (ϕl) < n, where n is the number of agents in the profile.
This simpler expression allows for a better understanding of what
swap optimality means. Overall, R-swap optimality aims at keep-
ing the most supported issues in the selected result: if g+P (ϕk) +
g+P (ϕl)) < n and if it it possible to swap ϕk to ¬ϕk and ϕl to ¬ϕl
in the profile, then the profile with the two negated formulae would
receive strictly more votes than the initial one.
It turns out that all these properties are not jointly compatible.
We first recall the impossibility theorem of [15] (for judgment ag-
gregation rules only).
PROPOSITION 1 ([15]). There exists no judgment aggrega-
tion rule that satisfy R-universal domain, collective rationality, col-
lective completeness, systematicity and anonymity.
This theorem is quite negative, but it relies on some strong as-
sumptions. First is the resoluteness (completeness) assumptions of
the individuals (R-universal domain), that can be criticized, since
one cannot expect all agents to have an opinion on all possible
issues; this is also the case of the collective completeness prop-
erty, that is helpful for making decisions, but forces to make some
choices even when there is no evidence enough to do so. Thus
the collective completeness requirement imposes sometimes to dis-
criminate further some judgment sets, using additional informa-
tion not given in the input profile. As such, it conflicts with the
anonymity and neutrality conditions. Suppose for instance a per-
fect tie (say, about a unique issue ϕ in the agenda, with 4 votes for
and 4 votes against it), why and how to make a distinction between
ϕ and ¬ϕ? See [8] for criticisms on the collective completeness
property.
The systematicity property is also highly criticizable. It prevents
from considering judgment aggregation as an optimization process
trying to achieve a best compromise, which is often expected for
aggregation methods. The following example illustrates it:
EXAMPLE 1. Let us consider an agenda X composed of the
following six formulae: ϕ1 = (¬a∨¬b∨¬c∨¬d∨¬e), ϕ2 = a,
ϕ3 = b, ϕ4 = c, ϕ5 = d, ϕ6 = e. Let us consider the pro-
files P and P ′ on this agenda, as given by Table 2. In the (res-
olute) profile P , every formula has a majority of votes, so using
simple majority vote all the formulae have to be selected, which
would lead to an inconsistent collective judgment set. So (at least)
one of the six formulae has to be rejected by the judgment aggre-
gation correspondence. There is a unanimity for ϕ1, so it seems
sensible to select ϕ1 in the result. All the other formulae except
ϕ2 are quasi-unanimously accepted (they get all votes but one).
The least supported formula is ϕ2, so the expected result is γP =
{ϕ1,¬ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4, ϕ5, ϕ6}.
Consider now the profileP ′. Simple majority vote leads to a con-
sistent collective judgment set γP ′ = {¬ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4, ϕ5, ϕ6},
which thus appears as the expected result. So, though the individ-
ual judgments are the same ones in both profiles for ϕ2, in the ex-
pected result for P ¬ϕ2 is selected, whereas for P ′ ϕ2 is selected.
Since ϕ2 gets the same votes pros and cons in the two profiles, no
judgment aggregation method satisfying systematicity is allowed to
make such a distinction.
This example illustrates clearly that the individual judgments on
an issue cannot be considered independently from those for the
other issues. This requirement conflicts with those supported by
the other rationality conditions, leading to the following impossi-
bility theorem:
PROPOSITION 2. There is no judgment aggregation correspon-
dence that satisfies R-universal domain, unanimity, majority preser-
vation, R-swap optimality, and systematicity.
PROOF. Consider Example 1, and a judgment aggregation cor-
respondence satisfying universal domain, unanimity, majority pre-
servation and swap optimality. As this judgment aggregation cor-
respondence satisfies universal domain, the two profiles are accept-
able. From the unanimity assumption, ϕ1 has to be in the result
for the first profile. Since the six formulae are not jointly consis-
tent, the negation of at least one of them has to be chosen. Using
the swap optimality assumption, ϕ2 must be rejected because its
support is lower than the one of ϕ3, ϕ4, ϕ5 or ϕ6. For the second
profile, the majority preservation assumption forces the result, as
the majoritarian rule gives a consistent judgment set: ¬ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3,
ϕ4, ϕ5 and ϕ6 is the result. This judgment aggregation correspon-
dence selects ¬ϕ2 for the first profile, ϕ2 for the second profile,
whereas the support of ϕ2 is exactly the same one in both profiles.
Hence this correspondence does not satisfy systematicity.
COROLLARY 1. There is no judgment aggregation correspon-
dence that satisfies universal domain, unanimity, majority preser-
vation, swap optimality, and systematicity.
We want to stress that systematicity, which is often presented as
the counterpart of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) for
voting methods (surely because Dietrich and List [5] have shown
that when one wants to express Arrow’s Theorem in a judgment
aggregation setting, using propositions to encode the preference re-
lation, then IIA leads to the related Independence property), actu-
ally is stronger than IIA (see [17] for a similar statement). For this
reason, systematicity is set aside in the rest of the paper: we now
look for judgment aggregation correspondences satisfying univer-
sal domain, collective rationality, anonymity, neutrality, majority
preservation, unanimity, and swap (or R-swap) optimality. In the
next section, we prove that such a correspondence exists.
4. SUPPORT-BASED JUDGMENT AGGRE-
GATION
Let us now point out a general family of judgment aggregation
correspondences for which the selection of consistent collective
judgment sets is based only on the support obtained by their ele-
ments. To achieve this goal, let us first introduce a few definitions:
DEFINITION 2. Given an agenda X = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm}, a po-
tential solution M = 〈α1, . . . , αm〉 is a vector such that each αk
is either ϕk or ¬ϕk, and
∧m
i=1 αi is consistent. MX is the set of
all potential solutions given X .
Obviously, there is a direct equivalence between the potential
solutions and the consistent and resolute collective judgment sets.
Observe that MX is never empty.
DEFINITION 3. Given a profile P on X , the support set of P is
the multiset ss(P ) = {{〈ϕi, g+P (ϕi), g−P (ϕi)〉 | ϕi ∈ M} | M ∈
MX}.
Thus, the support set of a profile P reports the evidence pro and
against every issue of X , for each potential solution given X .
DEFINITION 4. A Support-based Aggregation Correspondence
(SAC) δ is a judgment aggregation correspondence such that there
exists a functionf such that for any consistent profile P on X ,
δ(P ) = f(ss(P )).
The definition of SAC therefore calls simply the result of the
aggregation process for each agenda to be determined solely by the
votes for or against each issue (no further information such as a
classification of formulae into premises and conclusions is taken
into account).
Clearly enough, each SAC already satisfies a number of proper-
ties of interest:
PROPOSITION 3. Every SAC satisfies universal domain, collec-
tive rationality, anonymity and neutrality.
While the majoritarian aggregation rule δmaj defined previously
is not a SAC since it does not satisfy the collective rationality con-
dition, we can easily define a SAC based on it, and more generally,
on qualified majority methods (quota methods):5
DEFINITION 5. Let q be any integer. The q-quota aggregation
rule δQq is defined as follows. For any agenda X , and any profile
P on X , we have δQq (P ) = {γQqP }, where for any ϕ ∈ X:
γ
Qq
P (ϕ) =
 1 if gP (ϕ) > q0 if gP (ϕ) < q? otherwise
The SAC δQqsac associated with δQq is defined as δ
Qq
sac(P ) = {M ∈
MX | if γQqP (ϕ) = 1, then ϕ ∈ M and if γQqP (ϕ) = 0, then
¬ϕ ∈M} if γQqP is consistent, and δQqsac(P ) = MX otherwise.
The δQqsac methods clearly suffers from a lack of accuracy when-
ever γQqP is inconsistent (all the potential solutions are kept in this
case).
Let us now introduce a specific family of SAC which does not
exhibit this drawback, the family of ranked majority methods. For
such correspondences, the selection of potential solutions is based
on their aggregated score:
DEFINITION 6. The score vector of a potential solution M =
〈α1, . . . , αm〉 given P is the vector of votes in favor of the issues
selected by this potential solution:
s(M) = (g+P (α1), . . . , g
+
P (αm)).
5δmaj is the 0-quota aggregation method δQ0 .
Note that s(M) is defined using only the "positive" support g+P of
issues. There is no need to consider the "negative" support g−P as
well, since the negations of formulae from X are also considered
in other potential solutions.
DEFINITION 7. An aggregation function is a mapping6 ⊕ from
Rm to R, which satisfies:
• If xi ≥ x′i, then (non-decreasingness)
⊕(x1, ..., xi, ..., xm) ≥ ⊕(x1, ..., x′i, ..., xm)
• ⊕(0, . . . , 0) = 0 (minimality)
• If σ is a permutation over {1, . . . ,m}, then (symmetry)
⊕(x1, . . . , xm) = ⊕(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(m))
Some additional properties can also be considered for the ⊕
function:
• If xi > x′i, then (strict increasingness)
⊕(x1, ..., xi, ..., xm) > ⊕(x1, ..., x′i, ..., xm)
• If ⊕(x1, . . . , xm, z) ≥ ⊕(y1, . . . , ym, z) (decomposition)
then ⊕(x1, . . . , xm) ≥ ⊕(y1, . . . , ym)
• If ∀i, z > yi then ⊕(z, x1, . . . , xm) > ⊕(y1, . . . , ym+1)
(strict preference)
DEFINITION 8. A ranked majority judgment aggregation met-
hod δRM⊕ associates with every profile P on agenda X the set
of potential solutions with the greatest score vector w.r.t. the ⊕
aggregation function, i.e., δRM⊕(P ) = {M ∈ MX | @M ′ ∈
MX s.t. ⊕(s(M ′)) > ⊕(s(M))}.
As expected, it is easy to show that:
PROPOSITION 4. Every ranked majority judgment aggregation
method is a SAC.
Some judgment aggregation methods pointed out in the litera-
ture belong to the family of ranked majority judgment aggregation
methods. Thus, the maxweight subagenda rule introduced in [11]
is the ranked majority method with⊕ = Σ. This particular method
also has a distance-based characterization, since it actually selects
the consistent judgment sets that minimize the Hamming distance
w.r.t. the judgment profile. But other ranked majority judgment
aggregation methods (in the general case, i.e., when ⊕ 6= Σ) lead
to methods which are not distance-based, because ranked majority
judgment aggregation methods consider the support of each for-
mula (on columns), whereas the distances are computed on profiles
(on lines). Another method defined in [11], namely the operator
δRA, is not a ranked majority method but the δRM leximax (which
is a ranked majority judgment aggregation method) refines δRA.
Other meaningful aggregation functions can be used to give rise to
other ranked majority methods. Let us mention for instance max ,
min , leximax , leximin7, Σn (the sum of the nth powers), etc.
Let us introduce a last aggregation function, that will allow us to
define an interesting ranked majority judgment aggregation method.
DEFINITION 9. Given a positive number q, let maj q be the ag-
gregation function given by:
maj q(x1, . . . , xn) = |{xi > q | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}|
For any profile P on X , let us define Maj as maj |P |
2
.
6Strictly speaking, it is a family of mappings, one for each m.
7The standard leximax and leximin functions can be encoded nu-
merically using Ordered Weighted Averages functions [24, 10] to
comply with Definition 7.
Ranked majority methods δRMmajq select the potential solutions
with the highest aggregated score, where the score of a solution
is the number of formulae in it which are supported by a majority
(which depends on the value of q). Interestingly, δRMMaj differs
from each of δRM leximax , δRM leximin , and δRMΣ :
EXAMPLE 2. Let X = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4} be the agenda with
ϕ1 = a, ϕ2 = b, ϕ3 = {(a ∨ b) ∧ c} and ϕ4 = (¬a ∨ ¬b) ∧ d,
and let the profile P on X be given by the following table.
ϕ1 ϕ2 ϕ3 ϕ4
1 1 0 1 1
2 1 0 0 1
3 1 1 0 0
4 1 1 1 0
5 1 1 0 0
6 0 1 0 1
7 0 1 1 1
Each of M1, M2, M3 below is a poten-
tial solution given P :
• M1 = 〈ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3,¬ϕ4〉, and
s(M1) = (5, 5, 3, 3)
• M2 = 〈ϕ1,¬ϕ2,¬ϕ3, ϕ4〉, and
s(M2) = (5, 2, 4, 4)
• M3 = 〈¬ϕ1, ϕ2,¬ϕ3, ϕ4〉, and
s(M3) = (2, 5, 4, 4)
Each of M2 and M3 is strictly preferred to M1 when Maj is the
aggregation function since they contain 3 formulae with a majority
whereas M1 contains only 2 formulae with a majority. Such a con-
clusion cannot be drawn when leximax , leximin or Σ are used:
each of δRM leximax , δRM leximin , and δRMΣ selects M1.
Let us now study the rationality conditions satisfied by ranked
majority methods δRM⊕ :
PROPOSITION 5. • Any δRM⊕ satisfies universal domain,
collective rationality, anonymity and neutrality.
• If ⊕ satisfies strict increasingness, then δRM⊕ satisfies ma-
jority preservation.
• If⊕ satisfies strict preference and decomposition, then δRM⊕
satisfies unanimity and swap optimality.
PROOF. We give the proof for the third result, the proofs for the
two first results are much easier.
• If ⊕ satisfies strict preference and decomposition, then γRM⊕
satisfies unanimity.
Let ϕ be a formula supported by all agents, n be the number of
agents. There is a potential solution Mu which contains all the for-
mulae supported by all agents (since agents are supposed to report
consistent judgment sets). Consider another potential solution M ,
and suppose thatM does not containϕ. Let (n, . . . , n, x1, . . . , xk)
be the score ofMu and (n, . . . , n, y1, . . . , yk+l) be the score ofM ,
with l ≥ 1 (we know that s(M) contains at least one n less than
s(Mu), as ϕ is in Mu and not in M ). As ∀i, n > yi,⊕(n, x1, . . . ,
xk) > ⊕(y1, . . . , yk+1) (strict preference). Thanks to decom-
position, we obtain ⊕(n, . . . , n,x1, . . . , xk) > ⊕(n, . . . , n, y1,
. . . ,yk+1) (in the remaining case, if ⊕(n, . . . , n, x1, . . . , xk) ≤
⊕(n, . . . , n, y1, . . . , yk+1), with decomposition we get ⊕(n, x1,
. . . , xk) ≤ ⊕(y1, . . . , yk+1): contradiction).
With non-decreasingness, we get ⊕(n, . . . , n, y1, . . . ,yk+l) ≤
⊕(n, . . . , n, y1, . . . ,yk+1), because yk+2 ≤ n, . . . , yk+l ≤ n.
Then the result holds: ⊕(n, . . . , n, x1, . . . , xk) > ⊕(n, . . . , n, y1,
. . . , yk+l). Equivalently, ⊕(s(Mu)) > ⊕(s(M)), and ϕ is cho-
sen.
• If ⊕ satisfies strict preference and composition, then γRM⊕ sat-
isfies swap optimality.
Suppose γP ∈ δ(P ), and ϕk, ϕl ∈ X such that γP |{ϕk,ϕl}
is consistent and max(s(¬ϕk), s(¬ϕl)) > max(s(ϕk), s(ϕl)).
Then as ⊕ satisfies strict preference, ⊕(s(¬ϕk), s(¬ϕl)) > ⊕(
s(ϕk), s(ϕl)). Then with decomposition ⊕ϕi∈X,i6=k,l(s(ϕi), s(¬
ϕk), s(¬ϕl)) > ⊕ϕi∈X,i 6=k,l(s(ϕi), s(ϕk), s(ϕl)): γP |{ϕk,ϕl}
is selected and not γP , contradiction. There is no ϕk, ϕl ∈ X
such that γP |{ϕk,ϕl} is consistent and max(s(¬ϕk), s(¬ϕl)) >
max(s(ϕk), s(ϕl)): swap optimality is satisfied.
As expected, the systematicity property is not satisfied in general
by δRM⊕ (this is an easy consequence of Theorem 1 and Proposi-
tion 5). However, the remaining properties can be jointly satisfied,
leading thus to a "possibility theorem":
PROPOSITION 6. δRM leximax satisfies universal domain, major-
ity preservation, anonymity, unanimity, collective rationality, neu-
trality and swap optimality.
The next proposition illustrates the importance of the complete-
ness condition on the input profile:
PROPOSITION 7. If P is a resolute profile,
then δRM leximax (P ) = δRM leximin (P ).
PROOF. For space reasons, we give only a sketch of the proof.
The first point is to prove that the lexicographic order between two
vectors is not changed if the identical values are retrieved from
these vectors. The relative order between two potential solutions
M1 and M2 is then characterized by the elements of M1∆M2
(the symmetric difference of both sets). Suppose that M1∆M2 =
{ϕ1, . . . , ϕk}. The score of each formula ϕi in the first solution
M1 is g+P (ϕi). Suppose that g
+
P (ϕ1) ≥ . . . ≥ g+P (ϕk). M2 con-
tains ¬ϕi, of score g+P (¬ϕi) = n − g+P (ϕi), thus g+P (¬ϕk) ≥
. . . ≥ g+P (¬ϕ1). Thus the score of ϕi is at rank j in the ordered
score vector associated withM1 iff the score of ϕi is at rankm− j
in the ordered score vector associated with M2.
When we compare M1 and M2 using leximax , the scores are
sorted in descending order. Suppose for example that M1 >leximax
M2. Then there is i ∈ [1, k] s.t. g+P (ϕ1) = g+P (¬ϕk) . . . g+P (ϕi−1)
= g+P (¬ϕk−i+1) and g+P (ϕi) > g+P (¬ϕk−i). When we compare
M1 and M2 using leximin the scores are sorted in ascending or-
der. For M1 the vector of scores we have to consider is (g+P (ϕk),
. . . , g+P (ϕ1)) and for M2 it is (g
+
P (¬ϕ1), . . . , g+P (¬ϕk)). Since
for l ∈ [1, i − 1], g+P (ϕl) = g+P (¬ϕk−l+1), we have g+P (¬ϕl)
= g+P (ϕk−l+1). So g
+
P (¬ϕ1) = g+P (ϕk) . . . g+P (¬ϕi−1) = g+P (
ϕk−i+1) and g+P (¬ϕi) < g+P (ϕk−i): M2 <leximin M1: the or-
der between M1 and M2 is the same one, whatever leximax or
leximin is considered.
This result is surprising, since leximax and leximin are quite
different operators: with leximin , more importance is given to the
minimal values, whereas with leximax , more importance is given
to the maximal values. Thus, for irresolute profiles δRM leximax and
δRM leximin lead usually to different results. This illustrates again the
fact that the "no abstention" hypothesis is not a harmless technical
simplification; indeed, it may change the results drastically in the
sense that methods which differ in general may coincide when only
resolute judgment sets are considered.
Some additional results are obtained by focusing on specific ran-
ked majority methods:
PROPOSITION 8. • δRMΣ satisfies universal domain, ano-
nymity, neutrality, majority preservation, collective rational-
ity and R-swap optimality. It does not satisfy unanimity nor
swap optimality.
• δRMMaj satisfies universal domain, anonymity, neutrality, ma-
jority preservation, collective rationality. It does not satisfy
unanimity nor R-swap optimality.
• δRM leximin satisfies universal domain, anonymity, neutrality,
majority preservation, collective rationality, unanimity and
R-swap optimality. It does not satisfy swap optimality.
PROOF. We give only some proofs, due to space limitation.
• δRMΣ does not satisfy unanimity.
Consider the following agenda: a, ϕ1 = a→ ¬b∨¬c, b, c, ϕ2 =
a → ¬d ∨ ¬e, d, e, ϕ3 = a → ¬f ∨ ¬g, f, g, ϕ4 = a →
¬h ∨ ¬i, h, i and three voters:
a ϕ1 b c ϕ2 d e ϕ3 f g ϕ4 h i
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
Consider any potential solutionMa containing a. As a is inMa,
one of the three formulae a→ ¬b∨¬c, b or c has to be withdrawn
fromMa, one of a→ ¬d∨¬e, d, e also, one of a→ ¬f∨¬g, f, g
and one of a→ ¬h ∨ ¬i, h, i. The support of Ma is s(Ma) = (3,
2,2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1), and its aggregated score is 23.
Consider now any potential solution M¬a containing ¬a. Then all
three formulas a→ ¬b∨¬c, b and c can be kept, a→ ¬d∨¬e, d, e
also, the same for a→ ¬f∨¬g, f, g and a→ ¬h∨¬i, h, i. So the
support of M¬a, is s(M¬a) = (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 0)
and its aggregated score is 24.
Accordingly M¬a is selected by δRMΣ , and unanimity is not
satisfied.
• δRMΣ does not satisfy swap optimality.
We consider the following example:
(a↔ b) 1 1 0 0 0 ∗ ∗
a ∗ ∗ ∗ 1 0 1 ∗
b ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 1 ∗ 1
The score of the potential solutionM1 = {a, b, a↔ b} is s(M1) =
(2, 2, 2) and Σ(s(M1)) = 6. It is easy to check that Σ(s(M2)) =
4, where M2 = {¬a,¬b, a↔ b}, and Σ(s(M3)) = Σ(s(M4)) =
6 where M3 = {a,¬b,¬(a ↔ b)} and M4 = {¬a, b,¬(a ↔ b)}
is (3, 2, 1). γRMΣ selectsM1,M3 andM4. However,M1 contains
formulae a and a↔ bwhose supports are lower than the support of
¬a: max(g+P (¬a), g+P (¬(a ↔ b))) > max(g+P (a), g+P (a ↔ b)).
γRMΣ does not satisfy swap optimality.
• δRM leximin satisfies unanimity.
Suppose that a formulaϕ is supported by all agents, and letM be
a potential solution containing all unanimously supported formu-
lae (M exists because each agent gives a consistent judgment set).
Let M ′ be another potential solution containing ¬ϕ. The score of
¬ϕ is 0, since each agent supports ϕ. Then the score of M ′ con-
tains at least one 0, whereas the score of M does not (since M
contains all unanimously supported formulae). As a consequence,
s(M ′) <leximin s(M), and all unanimously supported formulae
are in all elements of δRM leximin (P ).
5. CHOOSING RELIABLE SOLUTIONS
Besides rationality properties, another criterion for selecting a
judgment aggregation method is its capacity to truth tracking. This
capacity is assessed as the probability to point out the "true" col-
lective judgment set, assuming that the individuals are reliable, i.e.,
each agent is more likely to vote in favour of a issue which is true
than abstaining or rejecting the issue. More formally, suppose that
there is a true judgment set γ∗ on X , i.e., γ∗(ϕk) = 1 when ϕk is
true, and γ∗(ϕk) = 0 otherwise. An agent i is said to be reliable if
for any issue ϕk ∈ X , P(γi(ϕk) = γ∗(ϕk)) > 0.5.
As usual for truth tracking analysis [4, 14, 7], a number of as-
sumptions has to be made. Thus the n agents are supposed to make
their decisions independently of others (assumption of individuals
independence) and independently of decisions made on other is-
sues (assumption of issues independence). Furthermore, for the
sake of simplicity, an homogeneity assumption is often made, stat-
ing that the probability of an agent to make the right choice on
an issue is the same one, whatever the agent and the issue, i.e.,
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, P(γi(ϕk) = γ∗(ϕk)) = p.
These hypotheses are the same ones as those considered in Con-
dorcet’s Jury Theorem [4, 14] for voting. This theorem states that
for a given issue ϕk, if the individuals are reliable, homogeneous
and independent, then the most probable judgment on ϕk is the one
supported by a majority of individuals; and if the size of the profile
tends to infinity, then the probability to determine the "true" judg-
ment on the issue tends to 1. The Jury Theorem is actually one of
the main justifications of our ranked majority methods; indeed, the
assumptions underlying this theorem imply that the more supported
an opinion on an issue the more likely this opinion.
Now that this is stated, our purpose is to determine whether
the truth tracking criterion can be used to discriminate further the
ranked majority methods. In order to answer this question, one con-
siders it as a maximum likelihood estimation problem: the aim is
to determine the judgment aggregation methods which best explain
the observed individual judgments, under the above assumptions.
PROPOSITION 9. Under the assumptions of individuals inde-
pendence, homogeneity, reliability and issues independence, the
judgment aggregation method giving the maximum likelihood es-
timation of the profile P on X is δRMΣ .
PROOF. In order to show this result, we prove that under the
assumptions of individuals independence, homogeneity, and issues
independence, the probability that the profile P = (γ1, . . . , γn) is
observed when the potential solution M = (α1, . . . , αm) is the
true one M∗ is (with c(M) = Σmi=1g
+
P (αi)):
P(P = (γ1, . . . , γn) |M = M∗) = pc(M)(1− p)n.m−c(M).
P(P = (γ1, . . . , γn) |M = M∗) = P(P 11 = γ1(ϕ1)∩
P 21 = γ1(ϕ2) ∩ . . . ∩ Pm1 = γ1(ϕm) ∩ P 12 = γ2(ϕ1) ∩ . . .∩
Pmn = γn(ϕm) |M = M∗).
Since ∩ is commutative and associative:
P(P = (γ1, . . . , γn) |M = M∗) = P(P 11 = γ1(ϕ1)∩
P 12 = γ2(ϕ1) ∩ . . . ∩ P 1n = γn(ϕ1) ∩ P 21 = γ1(ϕ2) ∩ . . .∩
Pmn = γn(ϕm) |M = M∗).
Using the independence assumption between formulae, we get:
P(P = (γ1, . . . , γn) |M = M∗) = P(P 11 = γ1(ϕ1)∩
P 12 = γ2(ϕ1) ∩ . . . ∩ P 1n = γn(ϕ1) |M = M∗).
P(P 21 = γ1(ϕ2) ∩ . . . ∩ P 2n = γn(ϕ2) |M = M∗). . . . .
P(P 1m = γ1(ϕm) ∩ . . . ∩ Pmn = γn(ϕm) |M = M∗).
Taking advantage of the independence assumption between agents,
since exactly c(α1) agents among the n agents gives the right value
(probability p > 0.5 because of the reliability assumption) and the
n− c(α1) remaining ones do not (probability 1− p), we get:
P(P 11 = γ1(ϕ1)∩P 12 = γ2(ϕ1)∩. . .∩P 1n = γn(ϕ1) |M = M∗)
= pc(α1)(1− p)n−c(α1)
And then:
P(P = (γ1, . . . , γn) |M = M∗) =
pc(α1)(1− p)n−c(α1) . . . pc(αm)(1− p)n−c(αm) =
pc(M)(1− p)n.m−c(M).
Since the δRMΣ method selects the potential solutions M which
maximize the score c(M) = Σmi=1g
+
P (αi), it gives the maximum
likelihood estimation of the profile P .
Thus δRMΣ is the best method among judgment aggregation
methods (and not only among ranked majority methods) for identi-
fying the true solution, under the assumptions made.
As we mentioned above, the assumptions above are quite stan-
dard ones when voting methods are considered [25]. The most de-
batable one is the assumption of issues independence, which is not
satisfied in many cases:
EXAMPLE 3. Consider two formulae, ϕ1 = a ∧ b and ϕ2 =
¬a. If an agent votes for ϕ1, we know that she does not support
ϕ2 (since ϕ2 is inconsistent with ϕ1). Hence P (g+P (ϕ1) = k1 ∧
g+P (ϕ2) = k2) is different from P (g
+
P (ϕ1) = k1) · P (g+P (ϕ2) =
k2).
In this case, the assumption of issues independence is not satis-
fied8, so δRMΣ is no longer justified as the best choice for a judg-
ment aggregation method. Accordingly, we now get rid of the as-
sumption of issues independence while still considering the prob-
lem of discriminating the ranked majority methods thanks to max-
imum likelihood estimations. A good point is that, even when the
assumption of issues independence does not hold, a given issue is
as likely as the number of votes it receives is high. This means that
truth tracking can be done on a issue-by-issue basis, but then we
have to make decisions based on a vector of more or less supported
(hence more or less likely) formulae.
Intuitively, three very natural policies consists then in favoring
judgment sets containing as much as possible issues supported by a
majority, or in favoring judgment sets containing as much as possi-
ble most likely issues, or finally in favoring judgment sets contain-
ing as few as possible less likely issues. Formally:
DEFINITION 10. A judgment aggregation method δ satisfies the
Best/Card/Worst policy iff, for any profile P , all the potential so-
lutions of δ(P ) are preferred to the other potential solutions w.r.t.
Best/Card/Worst criterion.
Card A potential solution M is preferred to a potential solution
M ′ w.r.t. the Card criterion iff |{αk ∈ M | g+P (αk) >
n/2}| > |{αk ∈M ′ | g+P (αk) > n/2}|.
Best A potential solutionM is preferred to a potential solutionM ′
w.r.t. the Best criterion iff ∃αk ∈M s.t. ∀αl ∈M ′, g+P (αk)
> g+P (αl).
Worst A potential solution M is preferred to a potential solution
M ′ w.r.t. the Worst criterion iff ∃αl ∈ M ′ s.t. ∀αk ∈
M, g+P (αk) > g
+
P (αl).
The preferred judgment sets w.r.t. the three criteria do not co-
incide in the general case. According to the Card criterion the
judgment sets containing a maximal number of issues supported by
a majority of agents, hence a maximal number of likely issues, are
selected. However, this does not prevent from selecting judgment
sets containing issues having a very low support, and avoiding is-
sues which are very supported. Worse, when the number of absten-
tions is high, it can be the case that no issue at all is supported by a
majority of agents. In this case, Card is not discriminative enough.
Alternative choices are given by the Best criterion and the Worst
criterion, which evaluates respectively the likelihood of a judgment
set as the best (worst) support of an issue in it. Thus Best (resp.
Worst) corresponds to an optimistic (resp. pessimistic) evaluation
8Note that a similar assumption of issues independence is made
when maximum likelihood is used for defining the best preference
order by aggregation methods in voting theory, despite the fact that
similar problematic cases can be pointed out (see e.g. [25]).
of a judgment set. The following proposition shows that for each
policy among Best/Card/Worst, there is a ranked majority corre-
spondence which satisfies it:
PROPOSITION 10. • δRMMaj satisfies the Card policy.
• δRM leximax satisfies the Best policy.
• δRM leximin satisfies the Worst policy.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper gathers a number of results concerning the judgment
aggregation problem. The main contributions are:
• A discussion of the rationality properties of judgment aggre-
gation, especially a criticism of the systematicity property,
and the introduction of a new property (swap optimality).
• An impossibility theorem.
• A new family of judgment aggregation methods, the support-
based aggregation correspondences, for which the selection
of consistent collective judgment sets is based only on the
support obtained by their elements. We specifically focus on
the subset of ranked majority methods, and prove them to
satisfy most of the expected rationality properties.
• A truth-tracking justification of some specific operators of
this family.
This work opens several perspectives. One of them consists in
considering other rationality postulates for judgment aggregation
(as responsiveness and monotonicity, considered in [9]) and then to
identify the maximal sets of properties which can be jointly satis-
fied, to go from impossibility theorems to "possibility theorems".
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